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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The political landscape in the United States (not to mention globally) has historically and
continuously aimed to restrict the rights of transgender people. Major news stories regarding
harmful legislation tend to center around “bathroom bills” prohibiting people from using
restrooms that align with their gender identity; restrictions to athletic participation for trans
people; and failures to properly eradicate systemic biases against trans people that hinder their
employment and access to equitable and appropriate medical care. These legislative barriers in
the United States are accelerating in frequency, with 2021 being a record-breaking year for antitransgender legislation at state levels.1 These consistent and unrelenting attacks on the rights of
transgender and gender-questioning people pose serious threats more seriously to children within
this population.
Though President Joe Biden signed an executive order extending federal protections
against discrimination for LGBTQIA+ people on his first day in office,2 many states are
continuing to enact harmful legislation that further restricts the rights and freedoms of
transgender children and adults. More recently, Arkansas passed a bill on Monday, March 29,
2021 that comprehensively bans access to gender affirming care for trans youth in the state. Its
acronym is “SAFE”, which stands for Save Adolescents from Experimentation.3 This piece of
legislation, pushed by Republican lawmakers, is the first of its kind to be approved in the United
States, and is being condemned as one of the most dangerous and extreme legal acts against trans
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Identity or Sexual Orientation.” The United States Government. Accessed 3 May 2021,
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youth across the country by Chase Strangio, deputy director for transgender justice at the
American Civil Liberties Union LGBT & HIV Project.4 Even its name stands to reinforce
harmful perceptions of gender identity, by reinforcing the corrosive idea that that children must
be protected or kept “safe” from exploring their gender, and face danger when physicians
provide gender-affirming care. This bill prevents trans children under the age of 19 from
receiving any gender affirmation care, threatening felony penalties for any physicians who
provide care that is incongruent with the restrictions laid out in this act.
One treatment prohibited under this wide-reaching bill is the provision of pubertyblocking hormonal therapy, also known as PBT. PBT is mainly used to pause pubertal
development into one’s sex assigned at birth and proves helpful to children experiencing gender
dysphoria who seek further gender-affirming measures as they explore their gender identity. The
SAFE act aims to fully ban and restrict medical support for gender-questioning children,
regardless of a physician’s or a parent’s consent, until the child turns 18. This restriction of care
not only harms children in Arkansas, it also significantly sets back LGBTQIA+ rights by
reintroducing dangerous and incorrect perceptions of gender identity into legal and societal
dialogue.
Every day, transgender and gender-questioning children face harmful attacks from both
social and political angles that threaten their ability to embrace their gender identity. One
important element of care that children with gender dysphoria need access to is PBT. As
mentioned earlier, PBT provides necessary hormonal assistance to children as they approach
puberty and experience a disconnect between their gender identity and their body’s biological

Yurcaba, Jo. “Arkansas passes bill to ban gender-affirming care for trans youth.” NBC News, last modified 29
March 2021, accessed 20 April 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/arkansas-passes-bill-ban-genderaffirming-care-trans-youth-n1262412.
4
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development. The present medical system in the United States maintains that children in medical
contexts cannot provide consent until age 18; until then, they must defer to their parents or
guardian’s medical decision making on their behalf. Though this system may normally operate
well, as parents are able to understand the nature of medical situations and risk assessments for
non-identity bearing medical procedures like well-visits, medical procedures, or vaccinations
(though vaccine restriction is another politically charged issue, in and of itself), deferring to
parental consent has the potential to harm children when parents are unable or unwilling to listen
to a child’s perspective regarding identity-based care. Receiving gender-affirming hormone
treatment involves factors deeply personal and most apparent to the child experiencing gender
dysphoria. This deferral of autonomy to parents imposes serious barriers for children accessing
care. When put in the position to comprehensively deny PBT to their children, parents are not
always equipped with the best tools to make these informed decisions on behalf of their child.
Biases, denial, and misunderstandings or interpersonal barriers within parent/child relationships
stand to complicate their ability to make choices that reflect their child’s best interest. In this
thesis, I will argue that children requesting PBT should have comprehensive autonomy over
these medical decisions.
This thesis will begin, in Chapter 2, with an exploration into the basis of parental
authority over their children. I examine the “best interest view,” outlined in Robin Downie and
Fiona Randall (1997),5 which offers two main premises that guide parental autonomy over their
child’s medical care and interests. The premises are: (A) that children are incapable of
understanding their best interests and, conversely, (B) that parents can know and act in their
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child’s best interests. I then take time to unpack and provide objections to each of these premises.
Regarding Premise A, I question the assumption that children are incapable of understanding
their best interests by raising commonplace situations in which children are awarded the latitude
to conceive of and act upon their own interests. When tackling Premise B, I attack the view that
parents are always able to know of and act in accordance with their child’s interests by raising
instances in which parent’s judgements about their children is clouded by their own experiences.
In this vein, I examine the psychological phenomena called “ambiguous loss,” in which parents
grapple with feelings of loss when their children do not fulfill the idealized plans that parent’s set
for them. I argue that parents are not necessarily the absolute source of levelheadedness that they
are often assumed to be. Following an exploration of these premises, I provide an introduction to
the concept of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice is a specific, epistemic harm incurred by a
knower when their credibility is not provided sufficient weight by a hearer. Epistemic injustice is
revisited later in the thesis, however its introduction in this chapter serves to point out the
significance of epistemic harm in the discussion of surrogate decision making.
Chapter 3 focuses more closely on the application of parental autonomy to cases when
children with gender dysphoria request PBT and their parents refuse. The chapter begins with an
overview of the best medical practices for transgender or gender-questioning children. Following
a summarization of The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH)’s
“Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Non-Confirming
People,” as well as a review of other resources to understand the diagnostic criteria and nature of
gender-affirming care, I begin to apply the “best interest view” to instances of parent/child
disagreements regarding gender-affirming care. I revisit the phenomenon of ambiguous loss as it
pertains to a parent grappling with feeling like they “lost” their daughter or son when their child
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comes out and explores their gender identity. Drawing on Jeni Wahlig (2015)6, I will argue that
parental judgement cannot always be upheld as levelheaded when making decisions regarding
their child’s gender affirmative care.
Chapter 3 then presents a negative, harm-based argument against sole parental authority
in these medical decision-making contexts. Heavily integrating Maura Priest (2019),7 I explore
the harms incurred by transgender children and children with gender dysphoria when they are
denied access to care and rejected by their parents. These harms include, but are not limited to,
mental illness, homelessness, and epistemic harm. This chapter more closely analyzes the
incidence of epistemic injustice and uniquely applies one type of epistemic injustice, testimonial
injustice, to the experience of children with gender dysphoria who advocate for medical
resources and are rejected by their parents. I argue that when children share their gender identity
with their parents and request PBT but face resistance from their parents, children’s capacity as a
knower is significantly harmed as a result of epistemic objectification and other secondary
consequences of mishandling their voice.
The final substantive chapter of this thesis, Chapter 4, pivots to provide a positive
argument in favor of providing children who request PBT with greater decision-making authority
over their access to gender affirmative care. My four-premise argument combines the position of
a child’s epistemic agency with their decision-making capacity to conclude that children with
gender dysphoria are best positioned to determine whether PBT would be in their best interest.
My argument is subsequently qualified and clarified through the consideration of relevant

Wahlig, Jeni L. 2015. “Losing the child they thought they had: Therapeutic suggestions for an ambiguous loss
perspective with parents of a transgender child.” Journal of GLBT Family Studies, 11(4), 305–326.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1550428X.2014.945676.
7
Priest, Maura. 2019. "Transgender Children and the Right to Transition: Medical Ethics when Parents Mean Well
but Cause Harm." American Journal of Bioethics; Am J Bioeth 19 (2): 45-59. doi:10.1080/15265161.2018.1557276.
6
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objections. I focus primarily on two objections. The first raises the incidence of people
identifying as transgender during their childhood but discontinuing their gender transition. This
phenomenon, called “desistance,” is not without controversy, as critics argue against its general
use due to its implication of a gender binary.8
The second primary objection I focus on is the objection that providing children with
greater autonomy in medical contexts may introduce a “slippery slope” in the approach towards
medical decision-making and pediatric autonomy. In this case, I argue that my argument only
goes so far to advocate for pediatric autonomy in medical contexts that bear on procedures or
treatments inextricably linked to a child’s identity. Therefore, I will provide a principled
boundary to halt any concerns regarding the lengths with which my argument can be taken to
permit more radical or irresponsible instances where children can consent/dissent to medical
practice. I also take time to address objections I found to be less significant to my argument, in
which I argue that children are still best epistemically positioned to know what is in their best
interest despite the fact that they may not be fully abreast of the medical or clinical background
that influences their decision. In this vein, I further clarify that my argument only stands to
influence situations in which children receive support from their care providers (on diagnostic or
clinical grounds), but resistance from their parents.
Chapter 5 of this thesis concludes with a summary of each chapter, along with some
insights regarding the potential for further work to be done to examine this issue with a more
nuanced or deeper lens.
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CHAPTER 2:
THE BEST INTEREST VIEW: EXPLORING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines a common argument that accords parents decision-making authority when
it comes to determining their child’s care, followed by a brief introduction to epistemic injustice.
That argument, which I will refer to as the best interest view, is grounded in the idea that parents
are best positioned to act in their child’s best interests. Robin Downie and Fiona Randall (1997)
articulate this argument by drawing attention to two core premises.9 These two premises are: (A)
that children are incapable of understanding their best interests and, conversely, (B) that parents
can know and act upon their child’s best interests. Following an outline of the best interest view,
I will examine and argue against both premises.
I will then provide a basic overview of epistemic injustice, a form of injustice one
experiences in one’s capacity as a knower. One more specific type of epistemic injustice is
testimonial injustice, in which a knower’s testimony is accorded insufficient credibility.
Throughout this thesis, I will provide a novel way to use these phenomena to examine the harms
of parental interference and the suppression of a child's voice in medical decision-making. I am
most interested in cases where children and parents disagree about a course of care or treatment
options that stand to bear most heavily the child’s identity formation. As such, I will focus on the
children falling within the adolescent age-group (more specifically, children aged 10 and older)
as a young population undergoing an integral period of maturity growth and identity formation.
Later in this thesis, I will examine instances in which children who are exploring or questioning

9
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their gender identity and decisions regarding access to gender affirmation care to deepen my
exploration into identity-related medical decision-making. Throughout this chapter, however, I
will provide a more general analysis and exploration of parental authority over their children in
healthcare settings.

II.

OVERVIEW OF PATERNALISM AND THE BEST INTEREST VIEW

Understanding how parental rights are grounded is integral to understanding why parents serve
as the default medical proxies of their child in the first place. I would like to explore the
relevance of paternalism, one relevant philosophy through which parental rights over children
can be considered. Paternalism asserts that parents possess inherent authority over their
offspring’s decisions and behaviors to promote the most good for the aforementioned child. The
best interest view serves as one argument that utilizes paternalistic ideas to defend its premises,
which are as follows: (A) that young children do not know their own best interests and (B) that
parents do know their young children's best interests. These premises are outlined by Downie
and Randall (1997), in which they dissected the foundational claims central to parental control in
favor of promoting greater latitude for their children’s exercise of autonomy.10
In order to support Premise (A), a deficit in a child’s knowledge and understanding needs
to be established. Age and immaturity are cited as major factors disqualifying children’s voices
and autonomy. The lack of fully developed psychological faculties prevents the child from being
fully autonomous until, supposedly, they progress to an age that confirms their freedom and
independence. A child’s lack of fully developed faculties renders them incapable of balancing
their interests sufficiently; their lack of autonomy invalidates their opinions or beliefs.

10
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Premise (B), on the other hand, states that, though children are unable to make their own
decisions, their parents are generally knowledgeable enough to know of their child’s best
interests and are able to make decisions accordingly. Parents, as persons with full agency,
sufficient knowledge, and assumed maturity, are expected to know their child most intimately,
and therefore are best positioned to know their child’s best interests. They are capable of
exercising sound judgement and contemplation to act properly in accordance with what is “right”
for their child. Regardless of a child’s assent or dissent to a decision, parents are granted
comprehensive trust in judgement over decisions made in the best interest of their child.

III.

PREMISE A

One argument supporting Premise A of the best interest view argues that children, because of
their youth, are too immature to comprehend their best interests and act on them with a sufficient
understanding of the consequences and permanence of these choices. I would like to argue, on
the contrary, that children’s self-knowledge and emotional intuition are often more developed
than we give them credit for. Children are agents who actively experience and interpret the world
around them. As they repeatedly encounter both positive and negative consequences, children are
able to develop a sense of permanence and an understanding of how their actions affect
themselves and others around them. Their identities are not formulated in isolation; external
relationships provide children with opportunities to learn from others and formulate beliefs
central to their experiences as a person.
These identity-forming social situations culminate in deepening emotional maturity and
intelligence. Although they may be younger than 18, the generally accepted marker of maturity
and autonomy, a child or adolescent’s distance from that benchmark does not invalidate their
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present possession of these abilities. Though the timeframe in which a child may possess
sufficient self-awareness and autonomy will change for children at different levels of maturity or
growth, it would be unfair to make the blanket claim that all children or adolescents are unable to
perform this calculus in a sufficient way.
Of course, there are instances in which adolescents improperly assess risks prior to
enacting certain behaviors. Though it is understood that children will not always make decisions
with optimal risk-assessment or foresight, I think that the significance of certain medical
decisions that specifically pertain to a child’s identity formation is one area in which they may be
more reliable in their decision making. This thought will be revisited throughout Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4 of this thesis, but it is important to note that the missteps teenagers or children might
take in assessing the relative risk and reward of certain decisions in other areas are different from
the assessments of risk and reward of decisions that are pertinent to the situations that are
discussed in this thesis.
Another argument supporting Premise A is that children are not used to making largescale decisions that ultimately shape their developing identity in the long run. However, as we
examine accepted opportunities in which children exercise their decision-making capacities, it
becomes clear that children frequently make decisions that accumulate in large, identity-forming
ways. By providing children with the autonomy to decide on things as trivial as what sport they
would like to play, adults are providing children with the opportunity to act in ways that
influence their identity and sense of self. By providing children with the ability to design the way
they present themselves aesthetically, as well (including through their clothing choices and other
modes of self-expression), children are actively exercising self-knowledge and putting forth a
representation of their identity to present to their peers and the external world. These are
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consistent applications of calculated, identity-driven decision making that we readily provide to
children. Therefore, it would be misleading to claim that children are entirely unable to make
decisions and act in their best interest solely because they have never done so in official, more
structured instances. The accumulation of these choices primes children to understand their
identity, allowing for the ability to graduate to greater crossroads and opportunities to determine
and act on their interests and desires.

IV.

PREMISE B

Premise B maintains that parents are best positioned to know and make decisions in a child’s
best interest. Arguments for this premise typically attempt to prove that parents are more capable
of acting level-headedly. Parents can, for example, tune out temporary feelings of emotional
discomfort or strife to maintain focus on the decision at hand. The argument operates on the
assumption that children, by comparison, allow fleeting, distracting feelings or thoughts to affect
their cognition in ways that lead them to lose track of the important choice at hand. In the
previous section, I defended the view that children are more emotionally mature than we may
give them credit for. In conjunction with detailing the emotional capacity of children, the
incidence of parents operating with bias similar to the perceived flaws attributed to children must
also be addressed to further disprove Premise B. Here I will argue that parents, more often than
is typically acknowledged, operate with biases that affect their ability to make decisions in their
child’s best.
Some emotional experiences of parents culminate in bias that complicate claims asserting
parent’s relative emotional competence in making sound decisions for their children. Parents
commonly create a robust narrative of their child’s future, including expectations for a child’s
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behavior and identity. For example, when children are young, some parents may fantasize about
teaching them violin in the hopes they will grow up to become a virtuoso so they can proudly
attend their recitals. Others hope their children will follow in their footsteps or pursue completely
different identity forming interests. When their children actually grow up and share their interests
and intentions for themselves, it may feel disheartening for parents to watch their children
diverge from their imagined and intended path. In some instances of strong identity disconnects
between children and parents, parents may have feelings akin to grief or loss as their children
stray away from their idealizations.
A psychological phenomenon known as “ambiguous loss” has been applied to help
understand the experiences of parents with children whose identities or interests fall in discord
with what was imagined for them. Pauline Boss (2016) helps define and contextualize
ambiguous loss as unresolved or unverified feelings of grief in which the object of loss is
“psychologically missing but physically present.”11 Though the concept originated as a concept
to help understand the experiences of spouses of soldiers deployed for military service, it is now
also applied to other relationship-dynamic changes, such as divorce, immigration, or adoption.
When tasked with understanding a child’s best interest, parents may exercise an
opportunity for control to steer their child towards their own, idealized versions of their child
rather than catering to the actual interests or needs of their child. Ambiguous loss plays a role in
parent decision making by providing parents with a dichotomous choice, in which they can
further act to impose their idealization onto their child to prevent the loss they feel of that ideal
or address a child’s actual desire that may contradict the wants parents have for them. Especially
when these decisions surround changes to a child’s identity, such as medical decisions regarding

Boss, Pauline. “The Context and Process of Theory Development: The Story of Ambiguous Loss,” The Journal of
Family Theory & Review 8 no. 3 (September 2016).
11
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behavior-changing medications or other medical interventions, a parent may be unable to
separate the necessity for that intervention with the unwanted consequence of a departure from
their desired narrative.
Ambiguous loss provides significant evidence to support an argument against the claim
that parents are always best positioned to make decisions in their child’s best interest. The
difficult experience of ambiguous loss complicates a parent’s ability to make decisions for their
children as sound as we might like to assume. Though we may intend for parents to act with
levels of neutrality or clear-headedness in ways children may not be able to, parents themselves
experience a form of emotional hardship that has the potential to interfere with their objectivity
when making decisions for their children.

V.

EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AND TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE

There exists another reason to reject the assumption that parents are better positioned to know
what’s in the child’s best interests. As mentioned earlier in the discussion about children’s
emotional maturity, parents’ own perceptions of their child and subsequent determinations of
their child’s best interest may be shaped by biases against their child’s maturity. As explored in
the previous section, the experience of ambiguous loss exemplifies instances in which parents
grapple with feelings of loss when they realize their child diverges from their previously imposed
idealizations or expectations. As a result of these biases, a parent’s consideration of their child’s
voice may be diminished or belittled. In failing to accord their child’s testimony sufficient
credibility, they stand to harm their child in an epistemic way. The wrongdoing within this
dynamic is called testimonial injustice, a type of epistemic injustice.

14

Epistemic injustice is a distinct harm inflicted on someone based on their capacity as a
knower.12 Miranda Fricker (2007) explores one mode in which persons can be harmed in their
capacity as a knower – they can be harmed as testifiers. This is known as testimonial injustice.
This field of study examines the circumstances and conditions that need to be met for a hearer to
believe the testimony of a speaker.13 Testimonial injustice, as Fricker outlines, occurs when a
speaker is not accorded sufficient credibility. Often this credibility deficit is triggered by
prejudicial bias against a speaker’s race, age, gender, or sexual orientation. This concept is
identified by Fricker as a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype.14 A contemporary example of
this type of testimonial injustice, Fricker explains, is the incidence of Black people fighting
against doubt when articulating their negative or biased interactions with law enforcement
officers, based on existing racial bias.
Fricker outlines the harms of testimonial injustice in terms of primary and secondary
harms. The primary harm resulting from epistemic injustice is the wrong intrinsic to a speaker’s
being accorded insufficient credibility. This wrong can be understood in terms of epistemic
objectification. Epistemic objectification occurs when a hearer views a speaker as a mere source
of information, rather than an informant.15 Someone who is treated merely as a source of
information is incapable of actively interpreting or engaging with the knowledge they possess
and share. Viewing speakers as mere things, capable only of providing sources of information,
complicates their ability to be considered rightfully as an equal, epistemic agent, and serves to
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deprive speakers of respect and community that is typically afforded to reliable informants,
further othering and objectifying the speaker.16
Secondary harms are those that occur as consequences of the credibility deficit. Fricker
distinguishes two dimensions of these secondary harms: practical and epistemic.17 Practical
secondary harms from testimonial injustice encompass the tangible setbacks or challenges facing
a speaker when their testimony is afforded insufficient credibility. Fricker uses the example of
testimonial injustice occurring in a courtroom setting, culminating in a plaintiff receiving a
‘guilty’ verdict facing a daunting sentence or hefty fine. The other type of secondary harm
caused by testimonial injustice is epistemic. This may look like a speaker’s losing confidence in
their beliefs or their ability to justify these beliefs, imposing long-term doubt in or hindrances to
their epistemic agency. Secondary harms of testimonial injustice ultimately hold a broader
impact or hindrance on a person’s life, by either inflicting concrete impediments or imposing
pervasive concerns regarding their own internal perceptions of their capacity as a knower.
When a child shares deeply valuable information that reflects personal aspects of their
identity, and experiences a credibility deficit, stands to incur the harms distinctive of testimonial
injustice. One type of information that I am referencing and will explore further in this thesis is
the instance of children sharing testimony in regard to their gender identity. In Chapter 3, I will
explore these harms to support an argument in favor of providing children greater authority over
identity-based decisions made in their best interest specifically regarding access to medical tools
that assist them in their gender identity exploration. By exploring the experiences of children
experiencing gender dysphoria seeking PBT in the face of parental rejection and resistance, I will
advocate in favor of greater decision-making latitude for children. To do so, I will employ a
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more detailed approach to explore epistemic harms experienced by children experiencing gender
dysphoria in these situations, while also defending a harm-based argument against paternalism.
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CHAPTER 3: A HARM-BASED ARGUMENT AGAINST SOLE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY IN PBT DECISION-MAKING CONFLICTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will discuss conflicts between parents and trans children in medical decisionmaking situations regarding a child’s gender-affirming care. I begin this chapter by providing
clinical background information about diagnostic criteria that make children eligible for medical
treatments for gender dysphoria, as well as the gender-affirming medical interventions that are
available to these patients. Though options for gender-affirming care vary in their degree of
invasiveness, those offered to pediatric patients are typically limited to less invasive or
permanent options, including psychological support and endocrine/hormonal treatments.
The following chapters in this thesis will primarily examine the decision for adolescents
to embark on puberty-blocking hormonal therapy (PBT) to assist with their gender affirmation.
The reversible nature of PBT provides a greater opportunity to provide pediatric patients with
more latitude in exercising their autonomy over their identity-bearing medical choices. Because
these children must fall within a certain age group for PBT to be most effective, the window for
these puberty blockers to sufficiently pause their sex development is slim. The time-sensitivity of
these decisions, therefore, pose unique and pressing circumstances. PBT provides children with
the opportunity to further explore their gender identity, combined with psychological counseling
and socialization, without the pressure or influence of feeling trapped in a body advancing
towards a gender they feel uncomfortable with. Not only is it generally important to preserve the
wellbeing of children experiencing gender dysphoria, but it is also paramount that a child’s
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mental health stay as centered as possible to maintain that child’s eligibility to receive genderaffirming treatment in the future.
Following a clinical introduction to gender-affirming care, I will explore the general
nature of parent-child disagreements regarding the use of PBT. One common argument in favor
of parental decision-making draws on Premise B from the Chapter 2, holding that parents are
best positioned to foresee potential harm and protect their children from harm. However, parents
often inflict lasting harm on their children unknowingly in response to their child’s gender
identity and exploration. Parents often inflict harm without being aware of it, and they frequently
fail to agree on what constitutes significant harm to their children (i.e., mental health and
epistemic harms versus physical, medical harms), which would effectively invalidate an
argument that claims that parents are the most qualified to recognize and reduce harm on behalf
of their children.
In addition to outlining a traditional harm-based argument against giving parents sole
decision-making authority in these contexts, I believe the phenomenon of epistemic injustice can
be applied in novel ways to provide insight into a distinctive type of harm in these conflicts.
Testimonial injustice, a specific form of epistemic injustice, can be used as a framework to
support arguments in favor of allowing children to have greater control over their medical care.
Children are harmed when their voices are not accorded proper credibility and weight by their
parents due to biases held against their gender identity or age. Fricker (2007) lays the
groundwork to understand the nature of testimony sharing and the dynamic between speakers
and hearers. In this chapter, I will apply Fricker’s work to the instances of children diagnosed
with gender dysphoria being denied authority in PBT decision making by their resistant parents
to further argue against total parental authority in these clinical contexts. Testimonial injustice
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supplies a unique lens to examine how harmful it can be when children’s testimony regarding
their body and their interests are discredited based on assumptions that they are too young or too
biased to exercise sound judgement.

II.

BEST PRACTICES FOR PEDIATRIC TRANSGENDER PATIENTS

The focus of the remainder of this work will examine parent-child conflicts regarding PBT
administration. However. it is important to first understand the best practices regarding genderaffirming treatment options available to patients, specifically adolescents, who experience gender
dysphoria and who request medical interventions to affirm their gender identity.
There are different waves of gender-affirming steps that patients can advance through as
they embrace their gender identity. The process begins with a diagnosis or discovery of gender
dysphoria, the feeling that their sex assigned at birth conflicts with their gender identity. The
DSM V diagnostic criteria used to diagnose children with gender dysphoria requires that children
must express at least 6 months of discomfort with one’s gender experience as their gender
assigned at birth.18 Other diagnostic cues include changes in gender expression and presentation
through a strong rejection of typically masculine or feminine clothing, toys, or activities, and a
significant dislike of their sexual anatomy. For adolescents and adults, gender dysphoria
diagnostic cues advance into more pointed desires to align more closely with the primary and
secondary features of another gender. Specifically for adolescent patients, this involves the desire
to prevent anticipated developmental changes that advance biological features associated with
their sex assigned at birth. The World Professional Association for Transgender Health
(WPATH)’s “Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Non-
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Confirming People” advises mental-health experts to examine how this expression of gender
discomfort pervades a patient’s emotional and intellectual functioning, as well as their
relationships with peers.19
Options to assist patients in their gender transition span across a variety of different
treatments, varying in their degree of permanence and invasiveness. One level includes changing
one’s gender expression in cosmetic or aesthetic ways and adopting pronouns that align most
closely with their gender identity. Psychotherapy or counseling can assist with a patient's gender
exploration and cosmetic measures like hair removal, breast binding, or genital tucking. These
are examples of less invasive and less permanent steps that are often taken by patients as they
affirm their gender identity through presentation.20
A further step to be taken to assist with gender affirmation for trans patients is hormone
therapy. These treatments aim to masculinize or feminize the body, or, for patients in the
pertinent age group, delay the natural biological development into their sex assigned at birth. For
adolescents, hormone therapy can vary in permanence. Fully reversible hormone therapy for
adolescent patients consists in what are commonly known as “puberty blockers.” As patients
approach the ages of 10 or 11, their bodies begin to develop secondary sex characteristics, which
include facial hair growth and breast development.21 Puberty blockers are gonadotropin-releasing
hormone (GnRH) analogues, delivered by monthly injection, that act to suppress the
development of secondary sex characteristics. For those assigned male at birth, GnRH analogues
reduce voice-deepening, limit genitalia growth, and prevent the growth of facial hair.
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Conversely, those assigned female at birth would experience a delay in menstruation and breast
development after receiving GnRH analogues. GnRH analogues only pause puberty; when a
patient stops taking GnRH, puberty resumes.22 The timing of providing puberty blocking
treatment to stop the growth of secondary sex characteristics is integral to preserving a child’s
wellbeing as they navigate their gender dysphoria and desired next steps.23 Because PBT is
newer to the arsenal of treatment options for trans children, its long-term effects are relatively
unknown. Despite its impermanence, the main risks that PBT poses to a child’s health include
compromised fertility and barriers to bone mineralization, according to one study examining the
treatment’s long-term effects.24
Partially reversible hormonal therapies to advance gender affirmation are aimed at
masculinizing or feminizing the body. For male-to-female patients, hormones aimed at
minimizing the production of androgen, the male sex hormone, are provided prior to taking doses
of estrogen to decrease the body’s production of testosterone and induce feminization.25
Conversely, female-to-male patients begin taking testosterone to masculinize their body.26
For adult patients seeking gender affirmation, a more invasive and permanent step
towards gender transition can include surgical interventions. Options for surgical sex
reassignment range in detail and can vary in functional and cosmetic significance, but include
hysterectomies, oophorectomies, vaginectomies, and chest reconstruction for female-to-male
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patients and tracheal shaves, breast augmentations, facial feminization, or penile inversion
vaginoplasty for male-to-female patients.27

III.

PARENT/CHILD CLINICAL DISAGREEMENTS AND THE BEST INTEREST
VIEW

As explored in the previous section, puberty-blocking treatment (PBT) is most effective if taken
prior to or early in pubertal development. As a trans child’s body begins to develop secondarysex characteristics that are incongruent with their gender identity, the onset of puberty often
inflicts harmful blows to their mental health and wellbeing. It is imperative that these treatments
be administered as early as possible, when clinically indicated. Given the young age of children
receiving this treatment, parental consent is necessary prior to the administration of any
intervention. For children seeking PBT, their relationship with unsupportive parents, who
possess the sole authority over care they feel is necessary, is a challenge. Though in a perfect
world these discussions would be collaborative between parent and child, parents are in a
position to quickly override a child’s voice and delay PBT against a child’s expression of need.
In the next section, I will explore several arguments echoing the best interest view,
sketched in Chapter 2, that support parents having authority over a child’s medical care in the
context of starting PBT. One such argument is that parents are able to make decisions more
informed than their child, unbiased by the child’s own emotional strife accompanying their
gender dysphoria. Those opposed to allowing young pediatric patients to start endocrine
treatment argue that prepubescent children and young adolescents might be advocating for
gender affirmation medical treatments with a fervor guided by their need for psychological
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wellbeing (as opposed to conformed and certain gender identity). Understandably, the
psychological wellbeing of a child experiencing gender dysphoria is fragile. Many such children
experience psychological disorders like depression, anxiety, and attention-deficit disorders at
higher relevant frequencies than their cisgender counterparts.28 During puberty, children whose
bodies are developing into a gender they are uncomfortable with may feel a loss of control that
could be focused and harnessed through PBT, therefore gender affirmation therapy could serve
as a “quick fix” for the psychological discomfort they feel, questioning the authenticity of their
gender identity. Therefore, an argument would follow that children are too emotionally biased to
properly identify, with confidence, their gender dysphoria and should not be afforded greater
latitude in these decisions over their parents, who may approach these choices with less
emotional drive.29
Though concerns regarding a gender-dysphoric pediatric patient’s soundness of
judgement are important to consider, I argue against the presupposition that parents are
inherently better suited to make these medical judgements, given their reduced emotional
attachment to the issue. Revisiting the concept of ambiguous loss, parents of trans children can
acutely experience feelings of loss or grief as they get accustomed to the change in their child’s
gender presentation. Not only do parents of transgender children experience compounded grief
for the loss of their daughter/son, but they also grapple with the loss of normalcy they attributed
to having cisgender children.
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Wahlig (2015) uses the framework of ambiguous loss to examine the process of grief
and acceptance parents experience. Her work found that the anticipation of a shift in family
dynamic away from their former, cisnormative structure serves as a source of discomfort for
parents in this position.30 When a child comes out to their parents regarding their newly disclosed
gender identity, parents may grapple with the loss of these ideas and fantasies tied to the future
of their relationship with their children. Additionally, parents may interpret their child’s gender
transition as the loss of their cisgender child, as opposed to the recognition of that child’s gender
identity. Though the child is still physically present, their change in gender presentation can be
interpreted by parents as losing their child and being introduced to a new person.
Ambiguous loss is newly being used to define the relational and dynamic tension
experienced in family systems of trans children, but it serves as a helpful way to classify and
understand how parents conceptualize the experience of having a trans child. Ambiguous Loss as
a Framework for Interpreting Gender Transitions in Families by Jennifer McGuire details the
psychological or physical detachment that parents often embody, including relational distancing
or attempting to delay a child’s transition. These behaviors serve as a response to their own
experience of ambiguous loss.31 The levels at which ambiguous loss tends to be felt depends on
the cisnormativity that guides parents and family dynamics generally, however this phenomenon
is experienced even by supportive and accepting parents as they prepare to embark upon this
change.
The psychological experiences of parents facing ambiguous loss in response to their trans
child’s attempt at gender confirmation serves as a major problem when these agents have sole
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authority over their child’s medical treatment. Therefore, the incidence of ambiguous loss and its
impact on a parent's attitude towards their child’s transition minimizes the argument that parents
are best suited to act in their child’s best interest when deciding to receive PBT. Parents, no less
than children, undergo challenges that will impede their ability to make these complex decisions
based on their psychological experience. Utilizing a child’s emotional struggle to discount their
testimony and voice over their care, as Premise A of the best interest view implies, does not
sufficiently prove that parents should, in turn, possess total authority in these circumstances.

IV.

TRADITIONAL HARM-BASED ARGUMENT FOR PARENTAL REJECTION

In this section, I plan to dive deeper into the harms that occur when children are denied a voice in
PBT medical decision-making. In order to understand the importance of providing children with
a voice in PBT medical decision-making situations, we must understand the harm they endure
when their self-advocacy is silenced and disregarded. By utilizing a traditional harm-based
argument, I will explore the impact parents have over their trans children when they use their
platform as both caregiver and principal decider, to withhold care from their child.
Priest (2019)32 defends a traditional harm-based argument outlining the serious harms
trans children experience when they face rejection and resistance from their parents. Priest
notably explores the high incidence of homelessness within the trans community. Many trans
people, adolescents included, are forced out of their homes due to complete withdrawal of
support from their family, cornered into choosing whether to continue living in a household that
forbids them from expressing their gender, or leaving behind their family and any type of
financial support they receive to embrace their gender identity. Other studies have shown that
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financial stress is often cited by trans people as a challenge they experience as a result of their
gender identity, one that often forces many into homelessness or sex work to support
themselves.33 Priest also raises concerns about high rates of suicide among trans youth. In her
work, Priest cites two major studies that show that trans youth who receive support from their
parents are 82% less likely to commit suicide.34
Priest’s attempt to highlight the serious harms of unsupportive parents during a child’s
transition is compelling and important. Homelessness and suicide are serious dangers that plague
the trans community. However, I think it is worthwhile to add to Priest’s discussion of the more
drastic harms and explore more universal common experiences trans youth face that threaten
their wellbeing.
First, it is important to note the prevalence of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) and suicidal
ideation among trans youth. Studies have shown that trans youth diagnosed with gender
dysphoria experience NSSI and express suicidal ideation at higher rates than their cisgender
counterparts.35 Additionally, when examining how trans children describe their own mental
health, a Canadian study found that 70% of their participants whose parents strongly support
their gender identity report positive mental health, in contrast to only 15% of those whose
parents were not supportive.36 Studies that examine how to better support trans people
experiencing NSSI and suicidal ideation directly cite the importance of greater support and
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dialogue between them and their support systems. If the importance of a present and validating
support network is a clear way to better support this population, then the lack of such
interpersonal connection, let alone the experience of blatant rejection, clearly stands to seriously
harm these children.
Other difficulties trans children may experience and negatively internalize are changes to
their intimate familial relationships. Damage to intimate connections at home can occur as
parents distance themselves from their child, in both covert and more nuanced ways, as they
come to terms with their child’s gender variance. This type of withdrawal may be as seemingly
innocuous as parents connecting less with their child than they would have prior to their child
coming out, like resisting from engaging in small-talk, or more frequently avoiding eye contact
with their children, for example. Children desire connectedness and validation from their parents,
and a marked change or withdrawal of such connection ultimately poses harm to the child.
Especially during a sensitive and vulnerable time for this population, children may identify and
internalize a parent's change in behavior as a negative response to their self-advocacy and
identity in much more acute ways than one might assume. These withdrawals and forms of
parental rejection pose serious strains to a child’s relationship with their parents, as well. It is
important to note, from present literature and social survey data, that even perceived
ambivalence from parents towards a child’s gender identity poses a negative effect on a child's
mental health.37 Parents may not know that they are doing this, or they may justify their coldness
by explaining that they need time to properly process this change and, as explored earlier,
grapple with their ambiguous loss independently before they deem themselves able to engage
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with their child about it. However, it becomes clear that putting distance in the relationship
between parent and child can cause lasting and damaging harm.
Parents’ lack of effort in attempting to normalize their child’s gender identity can also
present as harmful rejection.38 Some examples of ways parents can make such an effort include,
but are not limited to, using a child’s proper pronouns, respecting a child’s name change, and
supporting or engaging in their child’s gender presentation. Parents who avoid leaning into these
changes and opportunities to show their support or outwardly ignore these desires deepen a
child’s concern regarding their own self-knowledge and the acceptability of their personhood.
It is important to note that facing rejection from parents can introduce harmful elements of selfdoubt that take a toll on a child’s psychological well-being, regardless of a child’s own certainty
of their gender identity. Children are conditioned to take behavioral cues and direction from their
parents based on the important role parents play in a child’s overall identity formation. Providing
a “cold shoulder” or a change in routine by ignoring or acting coldly towards a child also serve
as nonverbal, subtle clues of disappointment, with the goal of motivating a child to rectify their
behavior in an attempt to return normalcy to the relationship.
When these types of nuanced social behaviors start to appear once a child communicates
their gender variance, children can internalize this behavior as a rejection or as a signal that they
have done something wrong. Mimicking interpersonal responses reserved for shaping bad
behavior, parental coldness in response to a trans child’s identity imposes harm and complicates
their own self-knowledge and places barriers that muddle their ability to seek PBT or other
medical treatment. Based on the mental-health struggles trans children often already experience,
finding coldness when they may need comfort and acceptance inflicts harm that permeates their
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daily-routine and seriously strains their identity formation, mental health, and familial
relationships over time. As a child experiences these types of harms at home, it is understandable
that conversations regarding how a child can seek medical intervention to support their transition
may be stressful and difficult to handle. If a child attempts to advocate for themselves in this
way, despite meeting such resistance, and is met again with parental rejection, despite their
medical need and qualification for PBT, even more harm can be done.
On the note of harms resulting from interpersonal relationship dynamics enacted by
parents, it is important to note here, too, that parents are commonly viewed as harm-reducers for
their children. Their role as decision-makers is often defined by their unique ability to foresee
and mitigate risks to their children. These ideas are central to another argument defending
Premise B of the best interest view, as some purport that parents are positioned to act to reduce
harm for their children. However, throughout this chapter’s exposition of harms inflicted by
parents, it is clear that parents themselves are unknowing sources of harm for their children.
Therefore, the argument that parents should be sole decision makers for their children in these
cases, on the grounds that they are best able to identify, understand, and prevent risk to their
children, proves insufficient to defend exclusive parent authority over PBT decisions for their
children.

V.

TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE AND CHILDREN EXPERIENCING GENDER
DYSPHORIA

As discussed in Chapter 2, testimonial injustice born from negative identity-prejudicial
stereotypes affects populations who already experience broader social prejudice based on gender,
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race, or sexuality.39 Though not initially included in Fricker’s recent work, her framework of
testimonial injustice is being extended to the frequent prejudicial stereotyping of children’s
testimony. Michael D. Burroughs and Deborah Tollefsen (2016) state that prejudicial stereotypes
held against children include considering them as incompetent, untrustworthy, frequently
exaggerating, and especially suggestible.40 Havi Carel and Gita Györffy (2014) also note that
children are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice due to differing epistemic abilities during
various developmental stages.41 Trans children, as a population, are likely to experience these
identity-prejudicial credibility deficits, in response to prejudicial biases against their identity as
both a child and transgender person. Identity-prejudicial credibility deficits provide hearers with
leverage to discredit the value of a child due to biases against their age and sexuality.
Throughout this section, I plan to explore the intersecting prejudices that trans children
experience which may interfere with their ability to receive adequate credibility.
When children come out to their families as trans and request medical therapies to affirm
their gender identity, they may be met with skepticism from parents who question the certainty
and permanence of the child’s newly presented gender. Parents may feel as though their child
could not possibly be trans (as they had not exhibited any behavior that adult typically associated
with transgender people), and therefore reject that child’s testimony. This response, for example,
exemplifies the potential for parents to carry their preexisting biases against trans people with
them into decisions regarding whether to accept their child’s testimony. When parents quickly
write off a child’s “coming out” as a phase, or question their assuredness, they operate what
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Burroughs and Tollefsen call “childism.”42 Due to the notion that children are immature and
impressionable, their testimony is often invalidated and given less credibility than an adult’s
testimony would be when sharing information of a similar kind.
As I previously explored, children with gender dysphoria often experience rejection and
doubt when advocating for their needs, expressing the severity of their gender dysphoria, or the
legitimacy of their gender identity. Prejudicial views regarding the emotional and intellectual
capabilities of children may cause parents to view a child’s expression of their gender identity as
invalid, branding their emotional and gender struggle as a scapegoat for other social or identity
challenges a child may be facing. However, children who express gender alignment with their
sex assigned at birth rarely face testimonial injustice or criticism as they lean into their gender
identity. Daughters assigned female at birth and who continue to identify and present as female
seldom experience skepticism when they express alignment with their sex at birth. The testimony
provided by trans children, on the other hand, is frequently discredited and subject to resistance
from their parents. When they share discomfort with their sex assigned at birth, adults may voice
fears that this shift in identity must be temporary or misguided. This asymmetry between cisgender and trans children compoundedly imposes barriers to trans children receiving the genderaffirming medical care they need, while withholding validation integral to their psychological
health and development.
Much of the present literature regarding the incidence of testimonial injustice
experienced by children explores the harms of testimonial injustice that children undergo in the
context of sharing information developed in relation to encounters with others, or experiences of
external events. Burroughs and Tollefsen explore these experiences of testimonial injustice by
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extensively analyzing the conditions and considerations surrounding the use of children as
witnesses in criminal investigations and trials. They note that, despite copious empirical evidence
suggesting that children aged 6 or older are as accurate in recalling events and no more
suggestible than adults when questioned appropriately, negative prejudicial stereotypes continue
to brand children as unreliable testifiers.43 This insight into how adults impose bias onto the
testimony of children regarding memory or event recollection supplies helpful insight to
understand the unique nature of testimonial injustice that trans children encounter.
I would like to build upon Burroughs and Tollefsen analysis of children’s experience as
testifiers to provide further evidence as to the severity of the epistemic harm incurred by trans
children. Due to the unique testimony shared by trans children, I believe that trans children stand
to encounter deeper, more nuanced forms of these harms. Unlike memory testimony sharing, in
which observations of external events can be shared and verified to some degree, voicing one’s
identity and accompanying personal and intimate experiences is a different type of testimony.
A child’s internal experience of their gender identity is often all-encompassing and only
fully apparent by the agent experiencing this. The testimony shared by children regarding their
internal experience and gender identity is solely provided by the child and cannot be sourced or
affirmed elsewhere, unlike the utilization of children’s memories in criminal cases where facts
they provide can be corroborated or shared with others. For example, a child who reports that
they saw a blue car run a red light at an intersection and hit a pedestrian can be cross-checked
using CCTV footage or supporting statements from other witnesses. If a child were to report that
they were feeling hurt by the actions of a peer, however, there is no way to verify this statement
other than by using the information provided by the child. It’s impossible to justifiably disagree
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with a child expressing their emotions, because they are the only agent who are experiencing that
sadness and, thus, they are the sole person who can confirm these feelings. Even if, as a hearer,
the cause of this strife seems trivial, and that the child’s reaction seems disproportionate, it
would be harmful to the child to invalidate their pain and tell them that they cannot be feeling
that way.
In a similar way, parents learn directly and exclusively from their child about their gender
identity and experience with gender dysphoria, and are therefore fully reliant on their child’s
testimony to understand and accept this testimony. The child’s expression of their identity, too, is
rooted deeply within themselves. Therefore, the rejection of identity-based testimony for
children experiencing gender dysphoria is a compounded and unique harm that is incurred in
response to parental rejection in these instances. Due to the complex and deeply uncomfortable
nature of gender dysphoria for a child, the harms incurred by children experiencing testimonial
injustice in these cases may present a serious challenge for this population.
The testimony shared by children regarding their long-term, compounded experience of
their gender identity is information of a sensitive matter. Gender identity is complex and deeply
individualized. Two components include the internal experience of gender and the external
expression of gender. One may experience gender dysphoria within themselves but refrain from
embodying this change in their gender presentation. Building off of Fricker’s initial framework,
Burroughs and Tollefsen echo Fricker’s discussion of two important characteristics that make a
credible testifier: competence and sincerity.44 Competence surrounds a speaker’s perceived
knowledge regarding what they’re testifying about, and sincerity pertains to confidence in a
speaker’s moral trustworthiness as it influences their testimony.45 In cases of children with
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gender dysphoria, their competence is called into question regarding their age and mental health.
Questioning the sincerity of a child’s testimony, on the other hand, serves to specifically
invalidate the voices of these children in a unique way. When children share their gender
dysphoria, their sincerity can be undermined and questioned regarding the history of their gender
presentation, among other factors. Parents may deem a child’s credibility deficient because they
had never noticed abnormal behavior on behalf of their child that might signal their gender
identity. This line of discrediting oversimplifies the complex intersections between gender
identity and presentation, as they do not mutually guarantee each other. Branding a child as
insincere because a parent does not believe their child fits the stereotypical trans archetype is one
way in which trans children uniquely experience testimonial injustice.
In healthcare, persons are likely to experience testimonial injustice due to perceived
emotional instability and cognitive unreliability.46 Children with gender dysphoria are especially
subject to these beliefs. As explored in the Section IV, trans children often experience resistance
or criticism regarding their confidence in their effort to seek gender-affirming treatments, due to
concerns about the mental and emotional stresses they may be experiencing in tandem with their
gender dysphoria. It is important to note, as well, that even if the concerns raised by hearers
regarding the credibility of a speaker’s testimony are ultimately correct, the harms experienced
by the speaker due to the hearer’s invalidation remain.47 This presents as significant in the
discourse regarding fears of trans children “desisting,” reverting back to their gender assigned at
birth after undergoing the gender-affirmation process. It is important, then, to recognize that
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children should be approached responsibly and with sensitivity when regarding their testimony
and gender identity.

VI.

EPISTEMIC OBJECTIFICATION AND ITS HARM TO TRANS YOUTH

Previously, I explored the influence of rejection on children with gender dysphoria. In a deeper
sense, testimonial rejection hinders both the social and intrapersonal health of a person. It is
known that children formulate much of their social identity through comparison with their
peers.48 The social comparison trans children experience as they witness their peers sharing
testimony without resistance can provide a blow to their self-perceived competence and selfknowledge. Over time, the continuous doubt and skepticism these children face when sharing
their testimony can diminish their sense of self and confidence in their introspective capabilities.
Burroughs and Tollefsen state that a consequence of rejecting the testimony of children is that
the development of their epistemic virtues and intellectual self-confidence are undermined,
ultimately complicating one’s identity as a reliable testifier.49 Negative self-perception and loss
of confidence in one’s own intellectual abilities are two secondary, epistemic harms that children
experiencing testimonial injustice can experience.
As outlined in Chapter 2, a speaker stands to incur both primary and secondary harms
when they experience testimonial injustice. Earlier in this chapter, I outlined harms experienced
by trans children that fall into the class of Fricker’s secondary harms, or those that may occur as
a consequence of testimonial injustice. These include homelessness or suicide, as Priest outlined
in her piece, or residual mental health challenges following rejection or inability to access gender
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affirmation PBT. In this section, I will dive deeper into epistemic objectification as the primary
harm of testimonial injustice.
Epistemic objectification, according to Fricker, is the primary harm of testimonial
injustice. Fricker (2007) defines epistemic objectification as the act of undermining a speaker’s
testimony and views them merely as a source for information rather than a being capable of
possessing and engaging with knowledge; demoting them from “subject” to “object”.50 Aidan
McGlynn (2020) outlines seven ways in which epistemic objectification operates. Miranda
Fricker’s description of epistemic inertness is one mode in which agents are harmed, in which
the objectifier views the speaker as lacking epistemic agency.51 Using Martha Nussbaum (1995)
as a guide,52 McGlynn identifies many further forms that epistemic objectification might take.
For children with gender dysphoria, there are two additional forms of epistemic
objectification that are relevant to consider. The first is “denial of autonomy,” whereby the
objectifier treats the speaker as lacking in autonomy and self-determination. In the case of trans
children, this is exemplified by parents who discredit a child’s testimony regarding their gender
identity and desire to receive PBT because they view their child as beings who are incapable of
the contemplation and perspective necessary to make these decisions.
Another form of epistemic objectification is “ownership,” in which the objectifier treats
the speaker as being owned by another.53 While “denial of autonomy” plays on a child’s
perceived immaturity and incompetence relative to their age, “ownership” supports notions that
parents should possess autonomy over their child’s desires. In both forms of objectification, the
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capabilities of trans children to utilize their autonomy and express reflections on their selfknowledge are hindered. When trans children attempt to share their experience of gender
dysphoria and gender identity and continuously face belittlement or rejection from adults,
children can develop diminished confidence in their ability to know themselves. This self-doubt
can pervade their social relationships and can inflict lasting harms to their emotional health and
social wellbeing.
This primary harm not only acts to objectify and invalidate the epistemic agency of the
knower, but also sets them apart as atypical and “other.”54 This discreditation of a person’s
epistemic agency isolates them from a greater social group and inflicts a deep sense of rejection
onto the speaker. Though testimonial injustice can often inflict harm in interpersonal
relationships and encounters, this phenomenon doubles as a method in which social or
community powers assist in the experiences of discreditation and invalidation of agents being
harmed.55 In these instances, the capacity of children with gender dysphoria as epistemic agents
capable of sharing testimony is objectified and rejected by the same cis-normative community
that similarly inflicts acts of prejudice or exclusion on them in in practical, social ways (such as
complicating their ability to use public restrooms). Interpersonal exercises of testimonial
discreditation can be reinforced on greater social scales, amplifying the harms and entangling
testimonial injustice in inescapable social dynamics.

VII.
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Testimonial injustice provides a novel lens to understand the harms incurred by children
experiencing gender dysphoria when they advocate for gender-affirming treatment against their
resistant parents. In this chapter, I aimed to examine arguments, developed using the best interest
view, that are used to uphold parental autonomy in pediatric gender-affirming care contexts.
After questioning the soundness of claims regarding parent’s general competence over their
children and expectation of harm reduction, I led into a discussion of the traditional harm-based
argument advocating for greater latitude for children over their medical decision making in
identity-based care contexts. My focus on these harms aimed to underscore the damage that can
be done when children experiencing gender dysphoria are rejected by their parents and withheld
opportunities for affirming treatment for their gender identity. The population of children and
adolescents are especially vulnerable, as their age and the natural process of puberty itself poses
a harm to them, as they lose control and actively develop into a gender they feel disconnected
with. In this chapter, I outlined the fragile position that children experiencing gender dysphoria
are in and how imperative it is that comprehensive parental authority be questioned, as the
decisions parents make may not always be done in a child’s best interest.
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CHAPTER 4: A POSITIVE ARGUMENT FOR PEDIATRIC AUTONOMY IN PBT
DECISION-MAKING CONFLICTS

I.

THE POSITIVE ARGUMENT

Throughout this thesis, I have presented a mainly negative argument against parents having sole
decision-making authority when their children request PBT. In this section, I will provide a
positive argument that children should have this decision-making authority. I argue for the
maximization of pediatric autonomy in PBT medical contexts due to the reversibility and
impermanence of PBT, along with the harms that parental involvement poses to children in these
cases.
When making medical decisions that stand to affect some aspect of a child’s identity, the
child should be the primary decision-maker. As explored in the Chapter 3, deferring to parents
when a gender dysphoric child voices their need for PBT has the potential to inflict serious
harms, both epistemic and physical, on a child. Children experiencing gender dysphoria who
may identify as trans are the most knowledgeable of their gender identity and thus are best
positioned to determine whether PBT would be useful to support them through further identity
exploration.
My argument, when broken down into concise premises, is as follows:
1. A child is epistemically best positioned with respect to their own gender identity,
compared with anyone else.
2. If S is epistemically best positioned with respect to some aspect of their identity, then S
is epistemically best positioned to determine whether doing X (where X affects S’s
identity) would be in their interest.
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3. A child with gender dysphoria is epistemically best positioned with respect to whether
or not taking PBT would be in their interest.
4. Decision-making authority with respect to whether or not doing X (where X stands to
affect S’s identity) would be in S’s interest ought to fall to whoever is epistemically best
positioned with respect to whether or not doing X (where X stands to affect S’s identity)
would be in S’s interest.
C. The child with gender dysphoria ought to have decision-making authority with respect
to whether or not taking PBT would be in their interest.

By establishing a child’s epistemic positioning and ability to determine actions that fall
within their best interests, this argument attempts to clarify that children are therefore better
positioned than their parents might to make the decision to receive PBT based off of their gender
identity and epistemic experiences. This is an argument on which the epistemic position the child
is in regarding their gender identity justifies their decision-making authority in these cases. I
would like to clarify, however, that my argument solely applies to PBT decision making. I will
continue to explore this thought in further sections within this chapter, however I want to make it
clear that I am not advocating for children to have total autonomy over their medical care. For
example, children voicing their dissent over vaccinations or other necessary practices for more
trivial reasons like avoiding discomfort does not apply to my argument— I am only defending a
child’s autonomy in pertinence to identity-based decisions. I will revisit this concept in Section
IV of this chapter. I feel that PBT is circumstance unique from others due to the extent with
which it intersects with a child’s identity formation.
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Another caveat to my argument that will be expanded upon in later sections relies on its
exclusive use for PBT and no other gender-affirming medical treatment. Though there are further
options for gender-affirming treatment, including the use of estrogen or testosterone, these
treatments are not as easily reversible, and therefore requiring deeper certainty about one’s
gender identity and plan to transition. PBT, as a more neutral and reversible intervention,
supplies that necessary intermediate option before further gender-affirming care, if a child were
to pursue further action. If a child were to decide that they would like to seek further gender
affirmation interventions following the administration of PBT, further medical consultation and
even parental discussion could warrant that choice. But due to the more serious nature of those
other treatments, I consider them exempt from this discussion.
The remainder of this chapter will consider and respond to objections to the premises of
my argument. Though I focus primarily on objections to premises 3 and 2, objections to all
premises will be considered. By utilizing case studies and considering objections, I plan on
further clarifying and qualifying my argument to support the conclusion that children
experiencing gender dysphoria ought to have decision-making authority with respect to whether
or not taking PBT would be in their interest.

II.

RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS – PREMISE 2

Let’s now consider objections to premise 2 of my argument, which reads “If S is epistemically
best positioned with respect to some aspect of their identity, then S is epistemically best
positioned with respect to whether or not doing X (where X affects S’s identity) would be in
their interest.” As mentioned in the earlier section, my argument regarding pediatric patients
receiving greater autonomy for PBT decision making does not necessarily apply to other medical
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decisions. When supported by physicians who are familiar with the child and provide medical
approval, children should have greater autonomy solely when medical interventions pertain to
their identity, because they are best positioned to know their best interest.
Some objectors may claim that children, though they may formulate needs and desires
based on their identity, are not necessarily best positioned to act on these interests. They may
argue that this premise gives way for a “slippery slope” in which children are provided greater
latitude in decision-making settings, wherein children could refuse essential medical treatments
such as vaccinations or medications. Though this concern is understandable, my argument as laid
out in this thesis solely applies to medical decisions that stand to affect a child’s identity. This
“slippery slope” type of objection is invalid when applied to my argument, because I am solely
endorsing children’s decision-making autonomy when such decisions hold significant weight
over a child’s identity and when parents or other decision-making proxies are unable to best
understand a child’s need. The caveat of “identity based” epistemic positioning is integral to
providing a principled end to the slippery slope.
Requesting medical interventions to support a child’s gender identity exploration or
affirmation is unique from other essential medical services due to the deep, epistemic and
secondary harms and dangers that accompany inaction (as outlined in Chapter 3, Sections IV and
V). If a child were to dissent to receiving something like an essential vaccine or medical
procedure despite parental consent and medical necessity, the needs and benefits of vaccination
and grounds with which they may argue with this treatment are likely less entangled with
epistemic or identity factors than a child with gender dysphoria. Children dissenting due to
feelings of fear, anticipation of discomfort, or other factors should be validated and heard,
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however the depth and severity of need that these expressions of dissent may not provide as
compelling leverage that a gender dysphoric child may have.
One could argue that medical issues, like essential medical care that a child
fundamentally disagrees with, may be a case in which a child’s identity is at risk for changing, in
which case my argument and premise 2 may be of use. Let’s say there is a child who has begun
to gravitate towards and identify closely with the “anti-vax” movement. Their parents disagree
and are in favor of vaccines. An objector may try to argue that my second premise would permit
this child the autonomy to refuse essential vaccinations, as they are the best epistemically
positioned to understand how receiving a vaccine might weigh upon their identity.
However, I would push back against this claim. While there may be structural similarities
between the anti-vax child and the child with gender dysphoria, the harms and potential
outcomes are very different. In Chapter 3, I attempted to explore an in-depth analysis of the
harms experienced by gender dysphoric children when they do not receive PBT, or when they
face rejection when attempting to embrace or explore their gender identity. Those harms provide
a clear outline of the importance of providing children who request PBT with decision-making
authority. In the anti-vax case and other similar cases where medical decisions may hold more
ambiguous but clear weight on a child’s identity, the consequences that may arise on either end
of the spectrum of action—either providing this behavior-altering treatment or withholding it—
must be analyzed to a similar degree. However, I believe that due to the unique and widely
pervasive harms that transgender or gender dysphoric children experience, my argument suits
PBT delivery and does not apply to other medical treatments or interventions. Additionally, the
allegiance to a specific identity group like “anti-vaxxer” is very different from a child’s gender
identity. For a child to question their gender identity involves both psychological, social, and
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identity-based factors that culminate in their need for medical support as they navigate this
transition. As explored earlier in this thesis, the nature of gender dysphoria is unique from other
medical disagreements due to gender’s deep intertwinement with a child’s identity and the
serious harms resulting from inaction or rejection in response to these identities.
To conclude, some may object to premise 2 of my argument, “if S is epistemically best
positioned with respect to some aspect of their identity, then S is epistemically best positioned
with respect to whether or not doing X (where X affects S’s identity) would be in their interest,”
on the grounds that this presents a slippery slope: children would then have the authority to
consent or dissent to treatments because they may view some action as in their “best interest,”
when they may be misled or incorrect. I am exclusively endorsing this claim as it pertains to PBT
decision-making in cases where children with gender dysphoria are attempting to receive genderaffirming, necessary care. I am not, at this point, supporting greater pediatric autonomy in
pertinence to other medical situations, in which their dissent or assent may be valid but are less
attached to a child’s unique, epistemic positioning and identity formation. As outlined earlier,
there are some circumstances that prove to be a little more ambiguous when compared against
my argument, such as the use of pharmaceutical treatments for mental health or behavioral
diagnoses that stand to influence a child’s identity or personality. Though further consideration
and thought needs to be done regarding these types of grey areas, I continue to argue that these
instances are unique from and do not hold weight over the delivery of PBT for gender dysphoric
children.

III.

RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS – PREMISE 3
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This section will consider objections to premise 3 of my argument, which states that “a child
with gender dysphoria is epistemically best positioned with respect to whether or not taking PBT
would be in their interest.” One might be skeptical of accepting this premise, citing that a high
percentage of children who identify as transgender or experience gender dysphoria do not
continue to identify as trans later in life. Therefore, an objector may say that, because many
children diagnosed with gender dysphoria do not continue to fully identify as transgender or
receive further gender affirmation treatment, children are not best positioned to determine
whether PBT would be in their best interest.
Integral to the discussion of childhood gender dysphoria is a phenomenon often referred
to as “desistance,” the occurrence of children whose gender dysphoria does not continue into
adolescence or adulthood. I would like to acknowledge that this term carries controversy and
criticism, due in part to its enforcement of gender binaries, which will be addressed within this
section. However, the term is often brought up by objectors to access to gender-affirming care
for pediatric patients experiencing gender dysphoria, so, for the purpose of this discussion, I will
refer to it in this section. In order to fully address claims made in opposition to premise 3, it is
important to understand the significance and incidence of desistance within this population.
Much of the research regarding desistance and persistence (the terminology used to
describe lasting experiences of gender dysphoria) is controversial, as some clinicians say it
misrepresents gender identity; using language like “persistence” or “desistance” reinforces
gender binaries. Academic studies of these phenomena are heavily influenced “by changing
cultural norms, the self-perceptions of children and the ways that researchers interpret them.”56
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Nonetheless, the incidence of children whose gender dysphoria does not persist into adulthood
presents a potential argument against awarding children with greater autonomy over their
gender-affirming medical care.
One controversial study that is commonly cited in the desistance debate is Thomas D.
Steensma et. al. (2013). Steensma et al.’s piece recognizes prior data collected that found
persistence rates varied by study between 2% to 27%.57 Through informational interviews,
Steensma found that desisters reported their gender discomfort gradually decreasing between the
ages of 10 and 13. Steensma et al.’s study identified three factors associated with increasing or
decreasing feelings of gender dysphoria: a child’s social environment, sexual orientation, and
feelings towards puberty.58
Regarding the influence of a child’s social environment, many participants reported that
between the ages of 10 and 13, a natural social distance between females and males increased.
This “social distance” phenomena described by Steensma et al. describes the division that occurs
in childhood between social groups, where children begin to gather more closely with peers of
the same sex and engage less frequently with peers of the opposite sex. This social event often
pushes children towards more gendered interests or hobbies as well. For persisters, this caused an
increase in their pre-existing preferences for friends whose gender mirrored the gender they
identified with, resulting in deeper discomfort with their gender role. Desisters found themselves
taking up gender-typical interests and ultimately felt a greater affiliation with their sex assigned
at birth.59
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Sexual orientation was also cited as a factor influencing these participant’s gender
dysphoria. Several desisters reported the “disappearance” of their gender dysphoria following
their first experience of falling in love and a developing awareness of sexual attraction. Persisters
in this study all reported attraction to members of their sex assigned at birth. Steensma et al.
conclude that as children come to understand the genders they feel sexual attraction to, their
gender identity responds in turn. According to Steensma et al., desisters, experiencing attraction
to the sex opposite their sex assigned at birth, use this cue as evidence of their cis-gender
identity, while persisters, feeling attracted to those of their sex assigned at birth, feel further
clarity regarding gender dysphoria and continue to identify as trans. Though this pattern was
present in this study, it is important to note that being transgender does not imply any specific
sexual orientation. One’s gender identity is not synonymous with their sexual orientation.
Finally, when discussing attitudes towards puberty, Steensma et al. found that both
persisters and desisters experienced anxiety prior to and during the early stages of puberty.
Children who were identified as persisters found puberty to be extremely distressing and felt a
strong desire to seek further gender affirmation interventions. Desisting children did not report
experiences of severe distress in anticipation of puberty and found that, though some felt
insecure, the viewed their secondary sex characteristics as favorable.60
Steensma et al.’s study is highly controversial, in part due to their admittance of
participants into their study who did not fit updated DSM diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria
diagnosis (some participants may have been “subthreshold” for a gender dysphoria diagnosis).
The study also relied on questions that many have identified as leading or potentially problematic
questions, such as “Are you a boy or a girl?” Critics have voiced their concern with using lines
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of questioning that enforce a gender binary, believing that gender dysphoric children may
struggle to answer such a straightforward question as they attempt to integrate the gaps in
personal and cultural understanding of gender dysphoria along with language barriers (this study
was conducted in the Netherlands). Additionally, the study fails to address gender as a fluid
spectrum and approaches many of their participants and results with a binary lens, failing to
leave room for those who may identify as non-binary or gender nonconforming.
Though desisting is an important factor that should be considered when discussing access
to PBT for trans youth, I do not necessarily believe that the incidence of desistance is critical
enough to bar pediatric autonomy in PBT decision-making. My argument to provide children
with greater authority during PBT decision-making circumstances accounts for the potential for a
child to change their mind and potentially desist. Especially when such revelations surround their
gender identity, which can be deeply intertwined with social and intrapersonal factors, a child’s
gender identity exploration is a fluid and personal process. Self-discovery often requires trial and
error, and general decisions made during childhood are often subject to change or evolve over
the course of a child’s lifetime. Because PBT is impermanent, as reviewed in Chapter 3, it can
serve as a helpful tool for clinicians to provide some respite for gender dysphoric children prior
to more permanent or invasive gender affirmation medical interventions. PBT provides pediatric
patients experiencing gender dysphoria with a “pause” prior to further sexual development. If a
child enrolls in PBT and decides to desist, they are able to halt PBT and resume puberty to
continue to further develop their sex assigned at birth. If a child’s gender dysphoria persists after
PBT, they are able to consider further gender affirmation treatments. Providing children with
greater latitude in these medical contexts gives children the opportunity to explore gender-
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affirming treatment options while eliminating instances in which children may experience
testimonial injustice, as mentioned in Chapter 3.

IV.

RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS – PREMISE 1

Finally, we will examine objections posed to the first premise of my formal argument. Premise 1
states that a child is epistemically best positioned with respect to their own gender identity,
compared with anyone else. Some may push back against this claim by arguing that parents are
actually more knowledgeable of a child’s identity and can better synthesize a child’s identity and
needs to better act in their child’s interest. However, I would like to discuss the important and
unique dynamics that pervade decisions made by cisgender parents on behalf of their trans or
gender-questioning children.
Often, parents are able to directly understand or empathize with the concerns or fears that
their children may express regarding medical care. Parents themselves, in cases of vaccination or
medical procedure, have the experience and knowledge to sympathize and understand their
child’s perspective. Parents of gender dysphoric children who have not experienced the pain and
discomfort that their children are undergoing as they requestion medical affirmation treatment
are unable to epistemically position themselves to adequately determine the severity of need and
benefit of this treatment in a comparable way.
Further objections to this premise might question whether care providers might be better
positioned to make these decisions for children if parents cannot be. Though care providers and
physicians are better positioned from a medical standpoint, I still hold that children are uniquely
capable of accurately recognizing and sharing their epistemic needs. That is not to say that a
child who experiences gender dysphoria and requests PBT, but who does not meet the clinical
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markers of eligibility (which were outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis), should unequivocally
receive PBT despite physician’s denial. So long as a physician is withholding PBT for strictly
medical reasons and not because of bias they hold against children with gender dysphoria, my
argument permits physicians to deny or postpone PBT to children. Although children are not
positioned to veto clinical or diagnostic barriers to care, they are still epistemically best
positioned with respect to their gender identity.
As explored in the Chapter 3, the epistemic gravity with which identity-based or identityforming choices are made hold serious weight that stands to incur harm when their needs and
interests are overridden by other agents. Therefore, children experiencing gender dysphoria are
the better positioned over their parents in specific cases in which a child’s identity is the central
reason they are requesting this treatment.

V.

RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS – PREMISE 4

Premise 4 of my positive argument attempts to connect a child’s decision-making authority with
their epistemic positioning by stating that “decision-making authority with respect to whether or
not doing X (where X stands to affect S’s identity) would be in S’s interest ought to fall to
whoever is epistemically best positioned with respect to whether or not doing X (where X stands
to affect S’s identity) would be in S’s interest.” Objections to this premise may include the
argument that children cannot possibly be “best” positioned to make serious medical decisions in
ways their parents or adult guardians can, as children are unable to adequately foresee and act
properly with respect to a decision’s future impact.
But children are frequently provided the latitude and opportunity to control their gender
expression in non-medical ways, including using a new name, changing their pronouns, and
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presenting themselves through their clothing. These means of “socially transitioning,” as some
call it, are impermanent and guided by a child’s identity and determination of need. PBT pushes
this social transition one step further, as a way to afford them more time to explore their gender
identity without the pressure of puberty and biological development.
Because PBT is impermanent, I believe it operates in a similar way. Though PBT is
obviously more serious and complex of a process than changing pronouns or gender
presentation, children who pursue in PBT receive medical supervision and accompanying
support. In order to receive PBT in the first place, children must be diagnosed with gender
dysphoria and receive medical and social support to address any pre-existing medical or
psychological conditions that could interfere with their treatment. With physician supervision,
PBT can provide helpful and often necessary respite for children exploring their gender identity.
Their requests for and consent to treatment should be viewed as a sufficient to make them
eligible for this low-risk, high reward treatment. It is important to be weary of the risks and
potential harms that accompany the parental voice in these cases.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter, I presented a positive argument in favor of providing children
experiencing gender dysphoria with greater decision-making authority when they request PBT.
My argument aims to establish a connection between the child’s epistemic position to know what
is in their best interest as it pertains to their identity and their decision-making authority. In this
section, I explored potential objections to each of the four premises. I explored instances of
“desistance” and halting concerns regarding “slippery-slopes” to further qualify my argument in
favor of pediatric autonomy in the decision-making process.

52

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE CENTRAL ARGUMENTS

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the current social and political landscape in the United States has
persistently and relentlessly disenfranchised transgender and genderqueer people. Hindering their
access to basic resources such as bathroom use, participation in athletics, and (of utmost
importance in this thesis) medical care constitute serious attacks against this vulnerable
population. The SAFE Act, among many others of the same kind, is one example of legislation
that specifically targets children whose gender identity does not fall within the cisnormal
boundaries most commonly accepted in our present-day society. Throughout this thesis, I have
argued in favor of greater decision-making autonomy for children with gender dysphoria who
qualify for and request PBT, but who are denied access by their parents or guardians who
possess sole authority over their child’s medical care.
This thesis began with an exploration into the nature of parental authority. In looking at
why parents or guardians are generally tasked with making decisions and providing consent for
their children, I examined the “best interest view,” which rests on two central premises: (A) that
children are incapable of understanding their best interests and, conversely, (B) that parents can
know and act in acting upon their child’s best interests. I dedicated sections to exploring both
premises and objecting to these claims, often referring to or expanding on work done by Downie
and Randall (1997), who argue in favor of pediatric autonomy.
Following this general dive into the best interest view, I began to apply the best interest
view to the issue of children who experience gender dysphoria and who request PBT. Chapter 3
began by presenting basic information regarding best practices and diagnostic criteria for
transgender children. I then defended a negative argument against granting parents sole authority
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over their child’s care when children request PBT and their parents refuse to accede to those
requests. By exploring concepts like “ambiguous loss” and a traditional harm-based argument
against granting parents sole decision-making authority, Chapter 3 aimed to reject claims that
parents are better positioned to make decisions about gender affirmation treatment on behalf of
their child with gender dysphoria. Chapter 3 then segues into a novel negative argument that
rests on the epistemic harms that children experience when their voices are discounted in medical
decisions that hold serious weight over their identity. Drawing on the framework provided in
Fricker (2007), I argued that parent-child disagreements over care that stands to profoundly
influence a child’s identity, in the way that gender dysphoria and PBT do, can inflict deep
epistemic harms on children.
Chapter 4 of this thesis aimed to defend a positive argument for the view that children
should possess greater decision-making authority in PBT medical decision-making, concluding
that children with gender dysphoria ought to have decision-making authority with respect to
whether or not taking PBT would be in their interest. I dedicated sections to objections to each of
the premises within the four-premise argument, considering issues objectors tend to raise in these
debates.

II.

FURTHER WORK

This thesis provided a comprehensive dive into medical decision-making for gender dysphoric
children requesting puberty blocking therapy (PBT). I laid out both positive and negative
arguments that support pediatric authority for medical decision making in these situations. Based
on my conclusions, further work could be done to explore whether these arguments could be
applied to gender-affirming treatments that are less-reversable or more invasive, including but
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not limited to hormone therapies to feminize or masculinize the body, or sex reassignment
surgeries. Unlike PBT, these measures would require much deeper certainty in a child’s
judgement and decision-making capabilities, due to the relative permanence of the procedure. I
would be inclined to assert that this argument remains relevant to less invasive gender-affirming
methods that would be more challenging but capable of reversibility, like estrogen or
testosterone hormone therapy. However, I am much more reluctant to extend my work to afford
for pediatric autonomy when serious things like surgery are introduced into the conversation. In
this case, I think that permanence and irreversibility serve as prominent obstacles that
significantly rely on a patient’s ability to understand permanence and make life-long and costly
medical decisions. Despite this hesitation about permanence, the dive into the persistent harms
that rejection or withholding access to care poses on children experiencing gender dysphoria
leaves me feeling unsatisfied with the solution of mandating these children to sit in their
discomfort and wait until their experience gets worse or develops before they are permitted to
receive the interventions they seek.
More work should be done to examine how one’s epistemic position can be strengthened
over time to reach the necessary certainty that would allow for more permanent interventions.
This more general question could provide further insight into the development of one’s epistemic
agency as it pertains to their ability to make lasting decisions about their identity and interests.
Though it is relatively clear that as one ages, their epistemic agency and capacities as knowers
are strengthened, I think it would be valuable to investigate what specifically contributes to the
gradual increase in autonomy. Furthermore, more work could be done to examine what might
qualify a teenager, in this case, to exercise absolute authority over all aspects of their genderaffirming care. Essentially, one might be interested in examining the how a child, teen, or
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adolescent’s epistemic agency can be strengthened over time as it pertains to medical decision
making. I believe that the arguments provided in my thesis extend solely to identity-based
medical decisions for children, and that permanence and gravity of certain medical decisions
would have to correlate with a child’s relative age and, therefore, possession of autonomy.
I think that the significance of testimonial injustice in cases where children are ineligible
to make identity-based medical decisions should be further examined. In these cases, it seems
that the harms of testimonial injustice as outlined in Chapter 3 would be outweighed by the risk
of harm that results from permitting a child to act autonomously in specific medical contexts. I
am interested in how the degrees of harm can be rationalized in the terms of testimonial injustice
in these medical contexts, and I look forward to future work that might elucidate this conflict in a
clearer, more generally applicable way.
Finally, in a broader sense, I would like to explore whether the arguments presented in
this thesis apply to other areas of pediatric autonomy. In Halle Paredes (2019),61 I began an
exploration into how pediatric autonomy and assent weighs on decisions made by parents to
withhold prognostic and diagnostic information from their terminally ill children. I argued that
withholding this information fails to meet a standard of care for these patients, and that ageappropriate information should be conveyed to the patient regardless of their age. I hope to see
how my arguments for pediatric autonomy in contexts where children are deciding to pursue
PBT might connect with my earlier work examining end-of-life care and information sharing. I
think that the notion of epistemic harm or objectification would be worth analyzing in these
cases, as well. Can persons experience any type of epistemic harm or injustice if they are
completely excluded from dialogue?

Paredes, Halle. 2019. “The Littlest Voice: Ethical Considerations in Maintaining Patient Respect Through
Communication During Pediatric End-of-Life Care,” Duke Journal of Medical Ethics 1, no. 1
61
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This thesis provided the important foundations integral to many contemporary issues in
bioethics and health policy discussions, and I look forward to continuing this dive into pediatric
autonomy and epistemic agency as it applies to their experiences in health care.
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